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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses the ability of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) Trial Chamber to amend an indictment to add new charges based on the
discovery of new evidence during trial.* It will examine the limited case law at the ECCC, as
well as case law at other international tribunals, including the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”), International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). Further, this memorandum takes into consideration the
rules of other international tribunals and comparable national civil law jurisdictions to interpret
the Internal Rules of the ECCC pertaining to the amendment of the indictment and the roles of
the Prosecutor and Trial Chamber.
B. Summary of Conclusions

i. Once proceedings have commenced in the International Tribunals, the
Prosecution ordinarily makes a request that the Trial Chamber allow
amendment of the indictment.
Generally, amongst the international tribunals, the Prosecutor has discretion to amend the
indictment without leave of the Trial Chamber prior to the beginning of the trial. Once the
proceedings have commenced, if the Prosecution wishes to amend the indictment for any reason,
it must request that the Trial Chamber allow an amendment.

* Can the Trial Chamber add charges to the indictment based on the discovery of evidence at trial?
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ii. It is common practice amongst the International Tribunals that the Trial
Chamber may order the Prosecution to submit an amended indictment for
review.
Tribunal Trial Chambers have ordered the Prosecution to submit an amended indictment
for review during multiple trials. This order can be for a simple re-characterization of the
charges, withdrawal of charges, or to add new charges.
iii. The International Tribunal Trial Chambers use several balancing tests
when determining whether to approve an amended indictment. All
balancing tests are relevant no matter who has introduced the amendment.
The international tribunals have developed balancing tests to determine whether to
approve an amended indictment. An international tribunal Trial Chamber must carefully
consider these tests whether it has ordered the Prosecution to request permission to amend the
indictment or the Prosecution has made the request of its own volition. Most importantly, the
Trial Chamber must weigh the Prosecution’s obligation to prosecute serious crimes against the
fairness of the trial and the court’s ability to uphold the defendant’s rights.
iv. The ECCC Trial Chamber does not have an explicit right to amend the
indictment during trial to add new charges without a request to do so by the
Prosecution.
It appears that the ECCC Trial Chamber does not have an explicit right to amend the
indictment during trial to add new charges without a request to do so by the Prosecution. This
conclusion is based on three sources: (1) The ECCC Internal Rules, which stipulate that “[t]he
[Trial] Chamber may . . . change the legal characterisation of the crime as set out in the
Indictment, as long as no new constitutive elements are introduced”; (2) the recent Lubanga case
which held that adding new charges does not amount to a mere changing of the legal
characterization of the crime; and (3) the principles of the civil law system.
9

II. BACKGROUND
The ECCC’s procedure reflects the Cambodian model of criminal procedure, which is
based on France’s inquisitorial model due to their colonial connection.1 The Tribunal’s
procedure and Internal Rules reflect this in that
Special features characterize this system includ[ing] (1) the provision for
judicial investigation by "impartial" Co-Investigating Judges,(2)
participation of the defendants throughout the judicial investigation,(3)
substantive rights of victims to participate throughout the proceedings as
"civil parties", (4) wider appellate powers, including the right to hear fresh
evidence at appeal, (5) discovery of evidence being court-driven rather than
party-driven, (6) liberal rules of evidence, and (7) creation of a dossier (a
Case File).2
Though the Tribunal draws its procedure from Cambodian law and is very adamant about doing
so,3 there could be instances in which Cambodian law does not deal with the matter at hand.
Thus,
[W]here (1) Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, (2) there
is uncertainty in Cambodian law, and (3) Cambodian law is inconsistent
with international standards, the Agreement provides that ‘guidance may be
sought [from] procedural rules established at the international level.’ The
applicable procedural law at the ECCC must, therefore, be consistent with
‘international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law.’4
While the Internal Rules were developed to resolve any conflict, absence of rule, or
uncertainty in Cambodian Law, the ECCC has routinely looked to the jurisprudence of other
international tribunals and comparable national jurisdictions to interpret the Internal Rules.5 This

1

Robert Petit & Anees Ahmed, A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 8 Nw. U. J. Int'l Hum.
Rts. 165, 2010 at 169 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
2

Id.

3

Id. at 166.

4

Id. at 168.

5

Id. at 168-69.
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memorandum will discuss the amendment of an indictment to add new charges based on the
discovery of evidence at trial, an issue that the ECCC’s Internal Rules do not explicitly address.
Amendment of the indictment is a critical procedural process because an investigation is never
static. When further crimes are uncovered, it is ordinarily the Prosecution’s duty to request that
relevant charges be added to the indictment.6 Similarly, the Prosecution may also seek
permission to withdraw or expand on charges originally included in the indictment.7 The ECCC,
operating pursuant to the civil law system, using the inquisitorial process, elevates the role of the
judge. It is proper, then, that the Trial Chamber may order the Prosecution to submit an amended
indictment request. However, the ECCC Internal Rules, the recent Lubanga case, and the civil
law system that the ECCC is based upon do not suggest that the Trial Chamber has an explicit
right to amend the indictment during trial to add new charges without a request to do so by the
Prosecution.
III. ADDING NEW CHARGES TO AN INDICTMENT AT A PROSECUTOR’S REQUEST
A. Requests Submitted by a Prosecutor’s own Volition
At any stage of the proceedings, the Prosecutor of an international tribunal may seek to
amend the indictment, though procedure varies amongst the tribunals.8 Prosecutors often seek
amendments to remove co-accused, join additional accused, or to add, re-characterize, or
withdraw charges.9 However, when it comes to adding new charges, it is a much simpler process

6

KARIM A. A. KHAN & RODNEY DIXON, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, &
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 2009) at 234 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
7

Id.

8

Id. at 242.

9

Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
93 A.J.I.L. 57, 1999 at 73 (“withdraw certain counts against the accused (e.g., Jelisic, May 12, 1998), or to take
certain administrative steps, such as removing an accused who is deceased from a joint indictment (e.g., Kovačević,

11

to request an amendment prior to the beginning of the trial, between the time the indictment is
issued and when the indictee goes to trial, than to wait until the trial begins. For example, adding
charges prior to trial under ICTY Rule 50 is commonplace and seemingly unlimited in scope.10
In Blaskic, the Prosecutor amended the indictment not only to make it more specific, but also
added six new counts prior to trial.11 Blaskic was charged with thirteen counts in the original
indictment; the Prosector’s amended indictment expanded the scope of Blaskic’s culpability in
both temporal and geographical terms.12 In Kupreskic, a nineteen-count amended indictment
included charges for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.

May 12, 1998) or severing cases against persons in custody from those still at large (e.g., Kunarac)”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
10

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44
(2009) at Rule 50 [hereinafter ICTY Rule 50] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]. The relevant
portion of Rule 50 reads:
(A) (i) The Prosecutor may amend an indictment:
(a) at any time before its confirmation, without leave;
(b) between its confirmation and the assignment of the case to a Trial Chamber, with the leave of the Judge
who confirmed the indictment, or a Judge assigned by the President; and
(c) after the assignment of the case to a Trial Chamber, with the leave of that Trial Chamber or a Judge of
that Chamber, after having heard the parties.
11

ICTY Press Release, CC/PIO/135-E, Blaskic Indictment Amended, 4 Dec. 1996 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 49].
12

Id. Blaskic’s amended indictment contained charges for:
(1) persecution of Bosnian Muslims on political, racial or religious grounds (count 1, crime against
humanity);
(2) attacks on towns and villages inhabited by Bosnian Muslims (counts 2-3);
(3) killing and, intending to cause great suffering, injuring, both physically and mentally of Bosnian
Muslims civilian including women, children, the elderly and the infirm (counts 4-9);
(4) destruction and plunder of Bosnian Muslim property (dwellings, businesses, institutions
dedicated to religion or education, personal property, livestock) (counts 10-13);
(5) selection and detention on political, racial or religious ground of hundreds of Bosnian Muslims,
and inhuman treatment of the detainees: many of them were killed, beaten, forced to dig trenches
near or at the front line; subjected to physical or psychological abuse and intimidation; confined in
cramped or overcrowded facilities; deprived of adequate food, water and adequate medical treatment

12

Even if the accused has already entered a plea at the time of the request, a further inter
partes appearance to address the new charges may be all that is required to have the amendment
confirmed.13 Further, Rule 50 stipulates that “the accused shall have a further period of thirty
days in which to file preliminary motions pursuant to Rule 72 in respect of the new charges and,
where necessary, the date for trial may be postponed to ensure adequate time for the preparation
of the defence.”14
Once the trial begins, a Prosecutor must seek leave of the Trial Chamber or a Judge of
that Chamber to amend the indictment.15 Tribunal Trial Chambers have allowed amendments
during trial. In Akayesu, for example, the Prosecutor requested that the ICTR Trial Chamber
allow an amendment of the indictment to address evidence of sexual violence after Jean-Paul
Akayesu was originally charged with twelve counts of genocide and crimes against humanity.16
The Prosecution argued that this evidence had come forward only during trial perhaps due to the
“shame that accompanies acts of sexual violence.”17 The ICTR Trial Chamber approved the

(counts
14-15);
(6) taking of Bosnian Muslims hostages and their use in prisoner exchanges, and the halting of
Bosnian
military
operations
against
the
HVO
(counts
16-17);
and
(7) use of Bosnian Muslims as human shields in order to prevent the Bosnian army from firing on
HVO positions or to force Bosnian Muslims combatants to surrender (counts 18-19).
Id.
13

ICTY Rule 50, supra note 10, at (B) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

14

Id. at (C).

15

Id. at (A)(1)(c).

16

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER RWANDA, YUGOSLAVIA
AND SIERRA LEONE 372 (2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR96-4-T, Judgment (2 Sept. 1998), paras. 23, 417 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
17

Id.

13

amended indictment despite the protests of the Defence.18 The Appeals Chamber also dismissed
Akayesu’s argument against the new charges.19
More rarely, the international tribunal Trial Chambers have rejected amendments
proposed by the Prosecution during trial. The ICTY Trial Chamber, in Kovačević, refused the
Prosecutor’s request to amend the indictment that included charges for genocide and crimes
against humanity by adding fourteen new charges, increasing the size of the indictment by ten
pages.20 In rejecting the indictment, the Trial Chamber noted that “[t]he amendment sought
[was] not the result of the subsequent acquisition of materials unavailable at the time of the
confirmation of the Indictment”21 and that, if approved, the amended indictment would serve to
deny Kovačević access to a fair and speedy trial. The Prosecutor brought this decision to the
Appeals Chamber, which ordered that the amendment be allowed.22 The Appeals Chamber
found that no delay would result from the amendment, nor would it damage Kovačević's ability
to prepare a defense because the Prosecution had indicated an intention to amend the indictment
early in the proceedings and the defense failed to object.23 The Appeals Chamber also noted that

18

Id.

19

SCHABAS, supra note 16 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]; Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4A), Judgment (1 June 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 373 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]; Prosecutor v. Kovačević, IT97-24-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request to File an Amended Indictment (5 Mar. 1998) at para. 12 [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
20

21

Id.

Murphy, supra note 9 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]; See also Prosecutor v. Kovačević, IT97-24-AR73, Decision Stating Reasons for Appeals Chamber’s Order of 29 May 1998 (2 July 1998) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
22

23

Id.

14

“there is no rule of customary international law, outside the field of extradition, prohibiting the
prosecution from . . . developing further charges.”24
B. Requests Submitted Pursuant to the Order of a Trial Chamber
In some instances, a tribunal Prosecutor has not requested an amendment to the
indictment despite the discovery of new evidence. The Trial Chambers of several tribunals have
taken it upon themselves in these situations to invite or even order the Prosecutor to request an
amendment.25 For example, one judge of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Nikolic publicly suggested
that the Prosecutor allege counts of genocide and rape. Nikolic’s original indictment included
charges for crimes against humanity and breaches of the Geneva Convention, none of which
covered sexual violence charges.26 With the consensus of the other Trial Chamber judges, the
Chamber then declared that “the prosecutor may well be advised to review these statements
carefully with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan Nikolic with rapes and other
forms of sexual assault, either a crime against humanity or as grave breach or war crimes.”27
Though some international scholars, including Sean D. Murphy, associate professor of law at
George Washington University, question the propriety of a Trial Chamber that will sit in
judgment on the case ordering an amendment, the international tribunal Appeals Chambers have
upheld these requests.28

24

Id.

25

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 373 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Murphy, supra note 9 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
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C. Principles Weighed by a Trial Chamber when Considering a Prosecutor’s Request
When the Prosecutor requests an amendment of the indictment during trial, the Tribunal
Trial Chambers have a special obligation to consider several factors when deciding whether to
allow the amendment. First, a Trial Chamber must ascertain the scope of the amendment. An
amendment that adds news charges, rather than making minor changes such as correcting errors
or wording, is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Halilović
stipulated that “the ‘key question’ in determining whether an amended indictment contains new
charges . . . is whether it introduces a basis for conviction that is factually and/or legally
distinct from any alleged in the unamended indictment.”29 “Charges” can include either new
counts or mere allegations.30 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Lukić suggested that a factual case-bycase evaluation is appropriate and necessary when determining if a modification constitutes
adding further details or adding a new charge.31
If an amendment proposes new charges, a Trial Chamber must then consider multiple
factors in an attempt to balance the Prosecution’s obligation to prosecute serious crimes with the
fairness of the trial and the ability of the Court to uphold the defendant’s rights.32 The point at
which a Prosecutor introduces amendment strongly influences the impact of an amendment on
the defendant.33

29

KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, at 241 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46]; See also Prosecutor v.
Halilović, IT-08-48-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment (17 Dec. 2004),
para. 30 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
30

KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, at 242 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

Id.; Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Decision Granting Prosecution’s Motion to Amend Indictment and Scheduling
Further Appearance (1 Feb. 2006), paras. 17-18 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
31

32

KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, at 234-42 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

33

Id. at 234.
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With this in mind, tribunal Trial Chambers must consider what many tribunal decisions
have indicated to be the fundamental issue in whether to allow an amendment: avoiding unfair
prejudice to the defendant. The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Musema indicated that the later in
the proceedings the amendment is requested, the more likely that the defendant will suffer
prejudice if it the amendment is allowed.34 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Brdanin and Talić
defined unfair prejudice as follows:
The word ‘unfairly’ is used in order to emphasise that an amendment will not
be refused merely because it assists the prosecution quite fairly to obtain a
conviction. To be relevant, the prejudice caused to an accused would ordinarily
need to relate to the fairness of the trial. Where an amendment is sought in
order to ensure that the real issues in the case will be determined, the Trial
Chamber will normally exercise its discretion to permit the amendment,
provided that the amendment does not cause any injustice to the accused, or
does not otherwise prejudice the accused unfairly in the conduct of his defence.
There should be no injustice caused to the accused if he is given an adequate
opportunity to prepare an effective defence to the amended case.35

The Trial Chamber also held that tribunal Trial Chambers, when assessing unfair
prejudice, should consider: “(1) the potential of the amended indictment to improve clarity and
precision of the case . . . ; (2) the diligence of the prosecution in amending the indictment; and
(3) any undue delay or prejudice imposed on the defence by adopting the amendment.”36 The
ICTY Trial Chamber in Halilović concluded, based on this definition and ruling, that two factors
are especially important when determining whether to amend an indictment, namely (1) whether
the Accused has been given an adequate opportunity to prepare an effective defence; and (2)

34

Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment (16 Nov. 2001), para. 343 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 30].
35

Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application
to Amend (26 June 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
36

KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, at 235-36 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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whether the Accused's right under Article 21 (4)(c) of the Statute to be “tried without undue
delay” will be adversely affected.37
The Trial Chamber in Halilović further held that tribunal Trial Chambers should “weigh
the likelihood of delay in the proceedings against the advantages to the Accused and the
Chamber of an improved indictment.”38 Citing the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Karemera, the
Trial Chamber noted that
Although amending an indictment frequently causes delay in the short term, the
Appeals Chamber takes the view that this procedure can also have the overall
effect of simplifying proceedings . . . by improving the Accused's and Tribunal's
understanding of the Prosecution's case, or by averting possible challenges to
the indictment or the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Chamber finds
that a clearer and more specific indictment benefits the accused . . . because the
accused can tailor their preparations to an indictment that more accurately
reflects the case they will meet, thus resulting in a more effective defence.39

The ICTR Trial Chamber in Karemera further explained the principle, indicating that the
right of the Accused to be tried without delay is one of the factors to be taken into consideration,
while still being weighed with the amendment’s effect on the rest of the proceedings.40 Tribunal
Trial Chambers must take into consideration the delay that adding new charges will inevitably
cause, such as the loss of time due to the defendant entering new pleas and possibly filing
preliminary motions in opposition of the amendment.41 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Halilović
Prosecutor v. Halilović, IT-01-48-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment
(17 Dec. 2004), para. 23 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22], citing Prosecutor v. Karemera et al.,
ICTR-98-44-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber III Decision of 8 October
2003 Denying Leave to File an Amended Indictment (19 Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Karemera Appeal Decision), para.
13 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
37

Prosecutor v. Halilović, IT-01-48-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment,
para. 23 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
38
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Karemera Appeal Decision, supra note 36, at para. 24 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

41

Id. at paras. 24-25.
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exercised this balancing test by deciding that even if an amendment would cause an initial delay,
if the amendment would serve to streamline the case overall, it should be allowed.42
Further, the ICTR Trial Chamber in Karemera indicated, in accordance with Brdanin and
Talić, that tribunal Trial Chambers should take into consideration the Prosecution’s due
diligence, or lack thereof, in regard to new charges and their timely introduction.43 United States
case law has defined “due diligence” as “that measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is
properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under
the particular circumstances.”44 Thus, in keeping with this definition, the Prosecution should not
hold an amendment request as a means of gaining a tactical advantage over the Defence, nor
should it attempt to include “new” allegations in an amendment that could, with the exercise of
due diligence, have been charged in the original confirmed indictment.45 Like the other factors,
due diligence is subject to balancing tests. However, the ICTR Trial Chamber in Mpambara has
indicated that if lack of due diligence is the sole issue at hand, it will not in all circumstances
result in a rejection of leave to amend an indictment.46 In Mpambara, the Trial Chamber held
that so long as the amendment would enhance the overall fairness of the trial, due diligence
could be outweighed.47
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It is of supreme importance for any tribunal Trial Chamber to balance these elements
when considering whether to allow the Prosecution to amend an indictment, even if the Trial
Chamber itself ordered the Prosecution to submit the amendment. The form of the indictment is
critical in upholding the rights of the accused when it comes to a fair hearing. This process will
help tribunal Trial Chambers avoid decisions being overturned on appeal for unfairly prejudicing
the defendant or failing to correct a fundamental defect. Further, tribunal Trial Chambers must
be careful to avoid the appearance of impropriety. With corruption being a highly scrutinized
issue at the ECCC, it is especially important to avoid the appearance of a corrupt judicial
institution or a miscarriage of justice.48 This is also an appealable issue, with the “typical
remedy against suspected corruption [consisting of]: 1) applying for the disqualification of a
judge from his case (pre- or post-conviction); 2) moving that the tribunal inherently lacks
jurisdiction because of corruption and bias; or 3) moving for a reversal of conviction on grounds
of an unfair judicial process.”49 Proceedings such as these not only extend the delay created by
the request to amend the indictment, but also continue to perpetuate negative connotations about
the tribunal’s propriety.
IV. ADDING NEW CHARGES TO AN INDICTMENT BY THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S OWN VOLITION
WITHOUT THE PROSECUTOR’S REQUEST

Based on the ECCC Internal Rules, which stipulate that “[t]he [Trial] Chamber may . . .
change the legal characterisation of the crime as set out in the Indictment, as long as no new
constitutive elements are introduced,” the recent Lubanga case which held that adding new
charges does not amount to a mere changing of the legal characterization of the crime, and the
48

See e.g. Michael A. Kertesz, Corrupt Conditions Surrounding the ECCC and Their Effect of Judicial DecisionMaking and the Appearance of Fairness, 2009 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
49

Id. at 8.
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principles of the French civil law system, it appears that the Trial Chamber does not have an
explicit right to amend the indictment during trial to add new charges without a request to do so
by the Prosecution.
A. The French Civil Code
The ECCC bases its Internal Rules on the French Civil Code due to its colonial
connection with France.50 French criminal law, based on the Napoleonic Code of 1810, codifies
its basis of criminal proceedings in the 1808 Code of Criminal Instruction (Code d’Instruction
Criminelle), its successor, the 1959 Code of Penal Procedure (Code de Procédure Pénale), and
revisions of 1992, 1993, and 1995.51 The French Civil Code, and as most civil law jurisdictions
also follow, describes the phases of criminal procedure to be the investigative phase, the
examining phase, and the trial.52 Further, there are sentencing and appeal phases if so required.53
i. Role of the Prosecutor
Traditionally, the Prosecutor, called the Ministère Public or the Parquet, plays a dual role
in French civil law.54 The Prosecutor not only prepares the government’s criminal cases, but
also represents the public’s interest in civil cases.55 According to the French Civil Code, the
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Apple & Deyling, supra note 51, at 31 (stating this occurs “[o]n the theory that the parties to a civil case will not
provide the judge with a full picture of the facts and law, the prosecutor may intervene to assert the public interest,
as opposed to the interest of the state”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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Prosecutor’s role begins in the investigative phase when the public Prosecutor collects evidence
and decides whether that evidence is sufficient to warrant formal charges.56
From this point, the examining phase begins. The formal judicial investigation is
conducted by an examining judge, the Juge d’Instruction or the Chambre d’Accusation. The
Juge d’Instruction or the Chambre d’Accusation is the equivalent of the tribunal Co-Investigating
Judges. The investigation is primarily conducted in writing and consists of a review of the
written record that the prosecutor has produced.57 The examining judge has the broadest
investigating powers and can collect further evidence and interrogate witnesses, including the
defendant, during this process.58 After the gathering of evidence is completed, the examining
judge will decide whether the case should proceed to trial.59 If so, the examining judge will
render a judgment of indictment, called an Arrêt de Miise en Accusation.60
Though the French Civil Code does not directly address the amendment of the
indictment, Article 190 indicates that “[i]t is for the public prosecutor alone to decide whether
there is a case for the resumption of the investigation on new charges.”61 The Code indicates that
the Prosecutor “makes any submission it deems appropriate in the name of the law.”62 Article
313 also indicates that “[t]he court must acknowledge these submissions and rule upon them.”63
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ii. Role of the Trial Chamber
Once the examining judge has issued an indictment, the formal trial will be handled by a
group of judges, the Cour d’Assises, who essentially “assess” the crimes.64 The Cour d’Assises
is equivalent to the tribunal Trial Chamber. In the French Civil Code, the Cour d’Assises has
jurisdiction to judge individuals assigned to it by the judgment of indictment from the examining
judge.65 Article 231 reads: “[t]he assize court has full jurisdiction to try at first instance or on
appeal those persons committed for trial before it by the indictment judgment. / It may not try
any other accusation.”66 Thus, under Article 231, the Cour d’Assises “cannot take cognizance of
any other accusation.”67
Despite this, in the civil law system the role of the judge is elevated compared to their
role in common law systems, where judges assume the role of an impartial party—acting
essentially as a “manager.”68 In contrast, the civil law judge “assumes the role of principal
interrogator of witnesses, resulting in a concomitant derogation of the role of lawyers during the
trial.”69 Though under the French Civil Code the Cour d’Assises does not have the ability to try
accusations that it has not been seized with through the indictment judgment, the Cour d’Assises
has the ability to modify the indictment should the prosecutor so desire under Article 190 and
Chapter VI Section I.70 It does not appear that the Cour d’Assises has the ability to bring their
64
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own pleading to amend the indictment, as the French Civil Code only mentions in Article 318
that the Prosecutor has the ability and in Article 315 that “[t]he accused, the civil party and their
advocates may file pleadings upon which the court must rule.”71
The role of the Cour d’Assises is not to bring its own pleadings, which might give the
appearance of impropriety. However, Cour d’Assises has the power to amend the legal
characterization of facts in an indictment. This power is derived from the civil law principle iura
novit curia, meaning “the court knows the law.”72 This principle generally allows a chamber to
modify the legal characterization of the facts, essentially to “determine that the facts and
circumstances pleaded in the charges should be characterized as a different crime or different
form of participation than that which the Prosecutor has chosen.”73
International courts widely accept iura novit curia as a general principle of law.
Regulation 55 of the ICC now explicitly provides for its recognition74 and the concept is also
recognized by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).75 Further, the ECCC also allows for the
exercise of iura novit curia in the Internal Rules via Rule 98, which reads: “[t]he [Trial]
Chamber may . . . change the legal characterisation of the crime as set out in the Indictment, as
long as no new constitutive elements are introduced.”76
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Iura novit curia, at its broadest, allows the court to base its decision on a legal theory that
has not been the subject of argument by the parties.77 However, a wide application of iura novit
curia has the potential to conflict with the parties’ authority to control the subject of the
litigation.78 Courts in most civil law jurisdictions stay within the pleadings and arguments of the
parties, typically within the legal characterization of the alleged facts in the indictment.79
Though its use can be limited by this practice, iura novit curia can help to prevent indictments
with an unnecessarily large amount of counts and, when used properly, can lessen the chance of
an acquittal on technical grounds.80
B. The Tribunals
The majority of international tribunals have never addressed the issue of a Trial Chamber
adding charges to the indictment of its own volition during trial. Most have addressed the issue
of iura novit curia to distinguish how far the principle extends. From these discussions and rules
of law, it is possible to ascertain a better understanding of how far a Trial Chamber’s power to
amend an indictment extends.
i. The ECCC and the Extent of Amendment Allowed by the Trial Chamber’s Own
Volition
a. The Indictment Process
In keeping with the French Civil Code, the procedure of the ECCC tribunal grants the
Prosecution the power to initiate the trial process. At the ECCC, because of its hybrid structure,
Douglas Brooker, Va Savoir! - The Adage “Jura Novit Curia” in Contemporary France, BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES,
2005, at 8 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
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the Prosecution is referred to as the Co-Prosecution.81 The Co-Prosecutors conduct a
“preliminary investigation” as a means of determining “whether evidence indicates that crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC have been committed and to identify suspects and potential
witnesses.”82 The Co-Prosecutors may then submit a request for judicial investigation to the CoInvestigating Judges.83 The Co-Investigating Judges serve the same purpose as the examining
judges in the French Civil Code. The Co-Investigating Judges exercise investigative powers to
collect further evidence and interrogate witnesses.84 If the Judges find “sufficient evidence” of a
crime or crimes at the conclusion of this investigation, they will issue an indictment.85 If the CoProsecutors and Co-Investigating Judges disagree, the issue is submitted to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for a judicial determination.86
The evidence collected by the Co-Investigating Judges and their indictment are the
foundation of the Trial Chamber’s case file.87 Before using this evidence at trial and as a basis to
make a judgment, the evidence must be “subjected to examination” by the Trial Chamber,
essentially a second investigation.88
b. Civil law and Rule 98
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Similar to the ICC and ICY, the ECCC recognizes the principle of iura novit curia. As
discussed above in Section IV(A)(ii), the ECCC’s Rule 98(2) reads:
The judgment shall be limited to the facts set out in the Indictment. The
Chamber may, however, change the legal characterisation of the crime as set
out in the Indictment, as long as no new constitutive elements are introduced.
The Chamber shall only pass judgment on the Accused. If another person,
appearing as a witness during the trial is suspected of committing a crime or
conspiring with someone to commit a crime, the Chamber shall only try such
person after he or she has been charged and indicted in accordance with these
[Internal Rules].89
The ECCC’s only decision to date, Duch, addresses the issue of “legal characterization” and how
far the Trial Chamber may impinge on Duch’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
charges against him. Joint criminal enterprise, a somewhat controversial theory in the
international spectrum, became contentious in the Duch trial when the Co-Investigating Judges
did not include reference to it in the Closing Order indicting Kaing Guek Eav, also known as
“Duch.”90 Appealing to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Co-Prosecutors argued that Duch is liable
under all three categories of joint criminal enterprise.91 The Co-Prosecutors further argued to
include the domestic crimes of homicide and torture in the Closing Order.92 The Pre-trial
Chamber granted the Co-Prosecutor’s appeal to include homicide and torture, but rejected the
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inclusion of joint criminal enterprise as a mode of liability.93 The Pre-trial Chamber cited
procedural grounds, ruling that Duch had not been adequately informed of the allegations of his
participation in a joint criminal enterprise prior to the Co-Prosecutors’ issuance of their final
submission in the case.94
ECCC Internal Rule 77(13) indicates that Pre-Trial Chamber decisions are not subject to
appeal.95 However, the Co-Prosecutors framed a request under Rules 92 and 98(2) and
submitted it to the Trial Chamber at the start of Duch’s trial, requesting the Trial Chamber to
amend the legal characterization of the crimes stipulated in the Closing Order.96 Specifically,
this request asked the Trial Chamber to “exercise its authority under Rule 98(2) to ‘change the
legal characterisation’ of the crimes set out in the Indictment so that the charges match the
evidence collected during the judicial investigation and described in the Indictment.”97 The CoProsecutors opined that because they supported the counts of joint criminal enterprise with
proper pleadings and sufficient particularity, any change in the legal characterization of the
crimes would not impinge on Duch’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges
he faces.98 Further, the Co-Prosecutors noted the Pre-Trial Chamber acknowledged that the Trial
Chamber has the power to decide whether or not to apply joint criminal enterprise after deciding
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that it would not add the charge to the Closing Order “at this stage” of the proceedings.99
Despite this, the Trial Chamber declined to issue judgment and stipulated that it will do so after
the case has closed.100
In its Judgment on the case, the Trial Chamber “determined, however, that commission
through participation in a joint criminal enterprise is an applicable mode of responsibility both
before the ECCC and in the present case, at least in its basic and so-called systemic forms”101
and “[a]ccordingly, the Chamber . . . found that, as a result of his participation in the systemic
joint criminal enterprise at S-21, the accused bears individual criminal responsibility for the
offences committed at S-21.”102 This positive ruling on the existence of joint criminal enterprise
in Duch allows for an expansion of the extent of all the Accused’s culpability for crimes
committed during the Democratic Kampuchea era.103 This decision also implies that regardless
of what is pled in the Closing Order, the Trial Chamber may be able to characterize the facts pled
as amounting to joint criminal enterprise at the close of trial.104
Unfortunately, this decision defines only the scope of the Trial Chamber’s ability to
exercise its authority under Rule 98(2) to “change the legal characterization” of the crimes set
out in the Indictment so that the charges match the evidence collected during the judicial
investigation and described in the Indictment. It does not look to the Trial Chamber’s ability to
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“change the legal characterization” of crimes set out in the Indictment based on the discovery of
evidence at trial, evidence which was not collected during the judicial investigation or described
in the Indictment.
c. Civil law and Rule 93
ECCC Internal Rule 93, setting out the ability of the Trial Chamber to conduct additional
investigations stipulates that “[w]here the Chamber considers that a new investigation is
necessary it may, at any time, order additional investigations.”105 These investigations may
consist of going anywhere within the territorial jurisdiction of the ECCC, interviewing witnesses,
conducting searches, seizing any evidence, or ordering expert opinions, under the same
conditions as the Co-Investigating Judges.106 Though Rule 93 is useful for gathering additional
evidence that may support an amendment to the indictment to add a new charge, it still does not
indicate that the Trial Chamber may take action and amend the indictment by its own volition
based on the investigation’s findings.
ii. The ICC and the Extent of Amendment Allowed by the Trial Chamber’s Own
Volition
a.

Regulation 55 and the Rome Statute

The ICC was created by the Rome Statute, which entered into force on July 1, 2002.107
The operation of the ICC is governed by its Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.108
105
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The ICC follows neither civil nor common law; it is a distinct international criminal law
procedure.109 However, as discussed previously, the ICC recognizes the principle of iura novit
curia. ICC’s Regulation 55 addresses this principle and its scope. Under Regulation 55(1),
regarding legal characterization in a final decision, the Trial Chamber
In its decision under article 74, may change the legal characterisation of facts
to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of
participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the
facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the
charges.110
Before the final decision, “at any time during the trial,” Regulation 55(2) permits the
Trial Chamber to change the legal characterisation of the facts.111 Pursuant to this Regulation,
the Chamber must, prior to any re-characterisation, notify the parties of such a possibility and
allow them an opportunity to make written or oral submissions on the matter.112 Sub-regulation
3 also requires that the Chamber “shall ensure” that the Defence be afforded “adequate time and
facilities” to prepare a defence to any re-characterisation attempt, including the ability to reexamine witnesses, call new witnesses, or present other admissible evidence.113 Regulation 55
and the ECCC’s Internal Rule 98(2) are similar in that a Trial Chamber may change the legal
characterisation of the crime as set out in the Indictment pursuant to the principle of iura novit
curia. Thus, at the very least, Regulation 55 permits the ICC Trial Chamber to change the legal
characterisation of the facts in the same manner that the ECCC authorizes in Internal Rule 98 and
the Duch case, without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the original charges.
109
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b.

The Lubanga case

On July 14, 2009, the ICC Trial Chamber attempted to expand Regulation 55(2)’s scope
during the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”) trial.114 Lubanga, founder of the Forces
patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (“FPLC”), was charged in August 2006 with three
counts of war crimes for conscripting and using child soldiers to further the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.115 In January 2009, the ICC Trial Chamber heard opening
arguments in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, its first case.116 For six months, the Prosecution presented
evidence of Lubanga’s role in the FPLC and the conscription and use of child soldiers.
In May 2009, before the Prosecution rested its case, the victims filed a request before the
Trial Chamber seeking a change in the legal characterisation of the facts in Lubanga’s
indictment.117 The victims sought to add new charges of sexual slavery and inhuman and/or
cruel treatment.118 Their request was based on new evidence discovered during trial—namely
the testimony of prosecution witnesses who indicated that the child conscripts were subject to
hard labor, food rations, grueling punishment, and that girls, in particular, were subjected to
sexual violence and recruited by the militia as sex slaves.119 The victims were essentially asking
the Trial Chamber to conclude that the facts presented during the Prosecution’s case in chief
114
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supported convicting Lubanga of charges that not originally confirmed by the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
1. The Trial Chamber’s decision
Over a strong dissent by Trial Chamber Judge Fulford, the majority of the Trial Chamber
responded by giving notice to the parties and participants in the trial “that the legal
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the
Regulations of the Court.”120 In particular, the Trial Chamber wanted to hear arguments
concerning whether the facts presented in the case should be “re-characterised” to support five
new charges against Lubanga, including: (1) sexual slavery as a crime against humanity; (2)
sexual slavery as a war crime in international armed conflict; (3) sexual slavery as a war crime in
non-international armed conflict; (4) inhuman treatment as a war crime; and (5) cruel treatment
as a war crime in non-international armed conflict.121 This controversial ruling held that the
Trial Court could base new charges on new evidence discovered during trial, not only on existing
facts, and modify the Indictment during the trial to include those new charges. Further, those
charges could be added without a request by the Prosecutor.
The majority of the Trial Chamber reasoned that it could change the legal
characterisation of the facts because of the differences between Regulation 55(1) and subregulations (2) and (3).122 It reasoned that Regulation 55(1) allows for substantive legal re120
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characterisations of facts at the final decision stage so long as the factual basis for such recharacterisations does not extend beyond the facts set forth in the charges.123 In contrast, the
majority noted, sub-regulation (2), which allows for re-characterisation during trial, does not
expressly limit a legal characterisation to the facts and circumstances described in the charges.124
Thus, any re-characterisation under Regulation 55(2) can exceed the factual scope of the
charges.125 The majority also held that the Regulation drafters must have envisioned that recharacterisation could exceed the factual scope of the charges because the drafters included due
process procedures in sub-regulation (3).126
The majority held that the evidence put forth by the Prosecution and the victims’ request
supported a possibility that such a re-characterization would occur.127 Both the Prosecution and
Defence disagreed and asked for leave to appeal the Trial Chamber’s decision.128 While the
appeal was pending, the Trial Chamber attempted to clarify its position on August 12, 2009.129
The clarification explained the scope of legal re-characterisation by stating that any additional
facts and circumstances “must in any event have come to light during the trial and build a unity,
from the procedural point of view, with the course of events described in the charges.”130
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2. The Appeals Chamber’s decision
On December 8, 2009, the ICC Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s
decision.131 The Appeals Chamber considered two issues in its judgment. First, whether the
Regulation 55 subsections can be read separately and, if so, whether subsections (2) and (3)
permit a change in the legal characterisation beyond the charges. Second, whether the Trial
Chamber erred in holding that the victims could request legal re-characterisation.132
In deciding the first issue, the Chamber addressed what the Defence considered
incompatibilities between Regulation 55, the Rome Statute, and international law. After
reviewing international jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber found that the possibility for a Trial
Chamber to modify the legal characterisation of the facts is compatible with the Rome Statute
and international law principles.133 The Appeals Chamber also found that modification is
compatible with the rights of the accused as long as he is given an adequate opportunity to
prepare an effective defence to the new legal characterisation.134 However, the Appeals
Chamber held that when using Regulation 55, including all of its subsections, a Trial Chamber
should not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges.135 Thus, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber improperly divided Regulation 55 (1) from subregulations (2) and (3).136
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Further, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber’s reading of Regulation 55
conflicted with Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute.137 Article 61(9) reads:
After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor
may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the
accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or
to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those
charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may,
with the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.138
Thus, re-characterisation according to the Trial Chamber’s reading of Regulation 55(2) would
give the Trial Chamber the power to extend the charges beyond the facts alleged by the
Prosecutor and be “contrary to the distribution of powers under the Statute.”139 Once the trial
has commenced, the Trial Chamber is limited to granting or rejecting a motion by the Prosecutor
to withdraw charges and cannot amend the confirmed charges to add new charges.140
Concerning the second issue considered by the Appeals Chamber, it was determined that
although victims are granted a role in trial proceedings at the ICC, they do not assume the role of
the Prosecutor.141 As Kevin Jon Heller, senior lecturer at Melbourne Law School, explains:
“[v]ictims have an absolute right to lobby, submit briefs, [and] argue in the court of public
opinion, but it is the [P]rosecutor’s final decision to bring charges.”142
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3. The decision’s impact
The Appeals Chamber’s reversal of the Trial Chamber’s decision was a clear victory for
the Defence, but also a victory for the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber reiterated the
Prosecutor’s powers under Article 61(9) of the Statute to define the charges, whether it be
through the original Indictment or amendments thereto. The decision ensured that the Trial
Chamber must defer to the Prosecutor’s ability to request the charges it so desires. The Appeals
Chamber clearly stipulated that Regulation 55 is not an avenue for circumventing the Indictment
for either the Trial Chamber or the victims who do not agree with the content of the proceedings.
Further, the Appeals Chamber refused to expand the principle of iura novit curia, under
which a judge may re-characterize the charges. Though the ICC adheres to neither common nor
civil law, this decision again defined the scope of the principle for all systems of law. A judge,
or in the case of the international tribunals—a Trial Chamber—may not re-characterize the
charges beyond facts already included in the indictment.
C. United States Civil Law
In United States courts, “[a]n amendment to an indictment is considered per se prejudicial
. . . because ‘it directly infringes the defendant’s right to know of the charges against him by
effectively allowing the jury to convict the defendant of a different crime than that for
which he was charged.’”143 The United States, with the exception of Louisiana, operates
primarily on the theory of common law. Like the ECCC, Louisiana law is based on the French
Civil Code, though to a much lesser degree. The court system itself is not at all similar to that of
the tribunals in that it is not composed of various Chambers.
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The case law in Louisiana on the subject of amendment during trial is in line with the rest
of the United States. In United States v. Young, the Court held that “[a]fter an indictment has
been returned, its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury
itself.”144 To amend the indictment otherwise, beyond a “variance,” results in reversible error in
keeping with the principle of iura novit curia.145 Thus, in the United States, adding new charges
to an indictment during trial would almost certainly result in a mistrial, no matter if the judge or
prosecution initiated the amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The ECCC Trial Chamber may amend the indictment during trial to add new charges
based on the discovery of new evidence, but only if the Prosecutor submits a request to amend to
the Trial Chamber. This conclusion is based on three sources: (1) The ECCC Internal Rules,
specifically Rule 98, which stipulates that “[t]he [Trial] Chamber may . . . change the legal
characterisation of the crime as set out in the Indictment, as long as no new constitutive elements
are introduced”; (2) the recent Lubanga case which held that adding new charges does not
amount to a mere changing of the legal characterization of the crime; and (3) the principles of the
civil law system.
So long as the Trial Chamber does not base an amendment on new facts or elements not
originally included in the Indictment, an amendment by the Trial Chamber’s own volition is
proper under the civil law principle iura novit curia. Thus, if the Trial Chamber seeks to amend
an indictment to add new charges and does not wish to defer to the Co-Prosecutors’ authority to
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request an amendment, it may order the Co-Prosecutors to submit a request as other tribunals
have done.
However, though ordering the Co-Prosecutors to request an amendment is technically
proper, it does not mean the Chamber should exercise this tactic frivolously. The propriety of a
Trial Chamber that will sit in judgment on the case ordering an amendment, especially in light of
Cambodia’s corruption issues, will likely be questioned. Further, the Trial Chamber should
generally avoid amending an indictment if possible. The Trial Chamber has a duty to weigh the
Prosecution’s obligation to prosecute serious crimes against the fairness of the trial and the
Chamber’s ability to uphold the defendant’s rights. When weighing a request to amend, the
Chamber should take into account not only the tests proscribed by various tribunals, but consider
strongly the economic and societal cost of amendment. For example, it would be sensible for the
Chamber to consider the economic cost of prolonging the trial and the societal impact on the
victims and community of either adding or refusing to add new charges.
The ECCC Trial Chamber—and international tribunals as a whole—is in a unique
position compared to other civil law jurisdictions in that its costs are higher and it is generally
more eminent. Whereas some civil law jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, have the benefit of
calling a mistrial and postponing the case when new charges should be added, the ECCC Trial
Chamber must take into account that a mistrial is not ideal in all situations, especially
considering that the tribunals spend years preparing a case for trial. There are certainly benefits
to amending an indictment during trial to add new charges based on the discovery of evidence,
and, accordingly, the tribunal Trial Chambers have approved amendments more often than not.
Regardless, it is prudent for both the ECCC Trial Chamber and Co-Prosecutors to weigh those
benefits against their obligations, duties, and other relevant criteria before ordering or requesting
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an amendment as a matter of general good preparation and to prevent unnecessary delay in the
trial or creating the appearance of impropriety.
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